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Outline
Reform of the Eurozone Governance
 Democratic Accountability in the EMU Economic 
Policy Coordination
 Democratic Scrutiny of the Eurogroup
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IIA for the European Semester
 Including a quasi co-decision
– Currently: Treaties do not allow for a role of the European Parliament 
for being a co-decision maker in economic policy coordination
• Commission drafts proposals or recommendations, 
• which the Council adopts
– Treaty is silent as regards the Parliamentary involvement before the 
vote in the college of Commissioners
– Quasi co-decision
• Self-commitment of the COM to submit draft proposals or draft 
recommendations to the European Parliament before the vote in the college
• EP can file amendments to these drafts
• COM can include these amendments or explain their rejection
IIA for the European Semester
 Proposal for a recital
The Commission shall commit itself to submit draft proposals or draft 
recommendations intended to be adopted under Articles 121, 126, 148 TFEU and 
under secondary legislating implementing these articles to the competent 
committee of the European Parliament.
Within in 1 month following the submission the competent committee may file 
amendments to the draft proposals or draft recommendations.
The Commission shall commit itself to report on the concrete follow-up of any 
request to amend draft proposals or draft recommendations within 1 month 
following adoption in the competent committee. The Commission shall accept 
the amendment. If the Commission does not accept the amendment, it shall give 
the competent committee detailed explanations of the reasons.
Democratic Scrutiny 
of the Eurogroup
Democratic Scrutiny of the Eurogroup
 Formally: Eurogroup is mere forum of exchange of views
– CJEU, Joined Cases C-105/15 P to C-109/15 P, Mallis: decisions of the 
Eurogroup are not intended to produce legal effects
 Strong de facto role
– Six pack: Information obligation of the COM within MIP
– Two pack: Submission of national draft budgetary plans and national 
debt issuance plans to the Eurogroup
– Identical to the ESM Board of Governors: Deciding on financial assistance
– Identical to ECOFIN deciding in matters concerning the multilateral 
surveillance procedure and the budgetary control
Democratic Scrutiny of the Eurogroup
 More transparency: Including the Eurogroup into Regulation (EC) 
No 1049/2001 on public access to documents
 More personal accountability: Merging the president of the 
Eurogroup and the president of the Board of Governors of the 
ESM with Commissioner for EMU
– President of the Eurogroup becomes personally accountable to the 
European Parliament as a member of the Commission
– Maybe: Modifying the IIA with the Commission in order to oblige the 
president of the Commission to make use of his/her right to request 
resignation of single commissioners if the president of the Eurogroup is 
concerned (exception to the principle of collective responsibility)
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